Browsing by Author "Rohtmets, Anna Elise"

Filter results by typing the first few letters
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Do Kuhnian revolutions suit biology?
    (Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Rohtmets, Anna Elise; Talpsepp, Edit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
    The aim of this thesis is to compare Kuhn's historiographical framework that he implemented on the history of physics with the history of biology to discover if it is meaningful to discuss biology from the perspective of a Kuhnian revolutionary historiography. Along with this broader aim, there is a secondary and more concrete reason to investigate if there is any merit in discussing Theodosius Dobzhansky's Genetics and the Origins of Species (1937) as a revolutionary text in the sense that it is similar to works like Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830), Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1867) and Antoine Lavoisier’s Elementary Treatise of Chemistry (1789) which lay the foundations to modern science in their respective fields. This inquiry will also address the status of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species (1859) as a revolutionary text as the significance of his work has been the center of much hype and historically questionable claims. By the end of this paper I wish to answer the question of whether a Kuhnian historiography is interesting to implement to biology. Is it able to shed light to new inquiries and interesting nuances about biology and does it help to clarify the still open question of a Darwinian revolution?
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Is 'fitness' a primitive or a propensity? Diagnosing the role of explanatory reductionism on differing standards of scientific definitions
    (Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Rohtmets, Anna Elise; Talpsepp, Edit, juhendaja; Kõiv, Riin, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
    This thesis explores the disagreement between the two earliest attempts by philosophers of biology to explain the meaning and explanatory role of evolutionary fitness in the theory of natural selection. I compare two interpretations of fitness: the propensity interpretation and the primitivist interpretation. Both aimed to solve the charge that due to the way fitness had been construed by biologists, the theory of natural selection offers circular explanations. I argue that their disagreement was not in their different understanding of what fitness is, but in their standards for a successful definition of fitness that would solve the charge. The primitivist interpretation required a reductive definition of fitness, while the propensity interpretation did not.