Browsing by Author "Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja"

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Benefit-sharing: an inquiry into justification
(2005) Simm, Kadri; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Takala, Tuija, juhendaja
Can contempt serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against the damage wrought by superbia? A critical analysis of Macalester Bell's account of contempt
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Meriste, Heidy; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis is focused on whether contempt could serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against superbia. My analysis is largely built on and developed in critical dialogue with a thesis put forward by Macalester Bell in her monograph “Hard feelings: the moral psychology of contempt” (2013). Bell is one of the few modern moral philosophers who have defended contempt as an emotion that has an important role to play in our moral lives. Even though contempt has often been rejected as a nasty and immoral emotion and it is not particularly difficult to come up with cases where contempt would indeed be unjustified, I find it hard to deny that there is a grain of truth in saying that the virtuous agent will love the good and hate the evil1. If we are to be consistent and wholeheartedly value morality, and we agree that emotions are important mediums through which we value things (as it is assumed by the current mainstream theories of emotion), then there seems to be a prima facie case for at least some hard feelings―understood as emotions that help us hold other people accountable for their wrongdoing, or, in case of superbia (which is more to do with character rather than some isolated acts of wrongdoing), their “badbeing” (Bell 2013: 39).
Educating for autonomy: is it just a pipe dream?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2020) Abdullayeva, Sariyya; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Francesco Orsi, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis explores the paradox of educating for autonomy. I state the underlying problem which is in an apparent incompatibility between education–a process of inculcation that shapes children’s values, beliefs, desires, etc., while bypassing their rationality–and the desired end of guiding children to become autonomous persons. I provide an outline of the possible solutions proposed by Richard Peters, Robert Noggle, and Stefaan Cuypers, and point out their deficiencies. Ultimately, I suggest a forward-looking solution, which considers the authenticity of children’s attitudes (values, beliefs etc.,) in relation to the child’s right to an open future.
Eetilised raamistikud inimuuringute eetikas
(2010-06-17T04:56:51Z) Lõuk, Kristi; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja
Erapooletu vaatleja empaatia keskne roll moraalis
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Rajando, Kertu; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Käesolevas magistritöös on vaatluse all empaatia roll moraalis – moraalse hinnangu andmise, moraalse motivatsiooni ja moraalse arengu juures. Eesmärgiks on uurida, kas leidub mõnda tüüpi empaatiat, mis on oluline moraalse kompetentsuse erinevate aspektide puhul. Esimeses peatükis annan ülevaade erinevatest fenomenidest, mida sageli käsitletakse empaatiana. Selgub, et empaatia mõiste defineerimisel puudub konsensus. Teises peatükis tutvustan Jesse J. Prinzi moraaliteooriat ja empaatia käsitlust. Näitan, et Prinz eitab empaatia rolli moraalis, kritiseerides peamiselt empaatia subjektiivsust ja kallutatavust. Kolmandas peatükis pöördun Adam Smithi moraaliteooria juurde, milles on tähtsal kohal sümpaatia. Smithi poolt kirjeldatud sümpaatia on tänapäeva kontekstis mõistetav empaatiana ning seega on selle käsitluse avamine asjakohane antud magistritöö raames. Smith kasutab sümpaatiat erinevatel viisidel, kuid moraaliküsimustes on kõige olulisem see sümpaatia tähendus, mis eeldab erapooletu vaatleja mehhanismi loomist, arendamist ja rakendamist. Sellisele sümpaatiale toetumine saab omada tähtsat rolli nii moraalsete hinnangute andmisel, moraalse motivatsiooni kui ka moraalse arengu puhul. Neljandas peatükis võrdlen Prinzi empaatia ja Smithi sümpaatia käsitlusi ning selgitan, kuidas suudab smithilik korrigeeritud empaatia ületada probleeme, mis prinziliku empaatia puhul ületamatuteks jäävad. Jõuan järeldusele, et erapooletu vaatleja empaatia on seda sorti empaatia, mis omab keskset rolli moraalis.
Privaatsuse filosoofilise kontseptsiooni piiritlemine
(2010-06-17T05:03:11Z) Laas-Mikko, Katrin; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja
Susan Wolf on moral perfection and the good life: a critical analysis
(Tartu Ülikool, 2014) Ross, Madli; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In a nutshell, the general problem of my thesis is concerned with the role of morality in life. If we agree with Wolf about principle-based moral theories leading us to the ideals that are not our ideals, then can moral values keep their position as the most important ones in the hierarchy of values? Maybe we can reach the good life when we look for a balance between different aspects of our lives as a maximum instead of maximizing one single principle and one set of values in our lives. When the latter holds, is there a hierarchy of values in the first place?