Exit, voice and loyalty as responses to dissatisfaction with international regimes; comparing responses of Turkey and Poland to Istanbul Convention

Abstract

Cooperation in anarchic international politics has been one of the most widely debated topics in the International Relations discipline. While some scholars investigated the underlying motives to understand the cooperation (Keohane, 1984; Galbreath, 2009), others tried to analyze the incentive of not participating (Slapin, 2009; Lavelle, 2007; von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). While trying to understand the incentive of not participating, each researcher identified one and repeated motive; dissatisfaction. According to Hirschman (1970) actors would respond to dissatisfaction in three different ways; an actor can exit , it can voice its dissatisfaction or it can simply remain loyal . In this study, Hirschman’s theory will be adapted to international relations to understand the variety of responses with dissatisfied regimes. This study puts out the hypothesis that type of response will be affected by the level of combined costs of anticipated audience cost and reputation cost. This hypothesis is tested by conducting comparative research between Turkey and Poland in the context of dissatisfaction with the Istanbul Convention. The analysis shows that a ‘high’ level of combined costs will lead states to make milder decisions while still expressing their dissatisfaction, such as ‘voice’ whereas, te ‘low’ or ‘medium’ level of combined costs suggests that states are more likely to take more drastic actions such as ‘exit’. This result of the study helps researchers to identify reasons that lead states to respond in varying ways to international regimes, even though they are considered as ‘golden standards’ for every state just like the IC (Amnesty International, 2021b).