Informal mutual oversight mechanisms in coalition governments: Insights from the Baltic states for theory building
Date
2018-04-16
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Abstract
Valitsuskoalitsioonide toimimine on keeruline. Koalitsioonid moodustatakse erinevatest, konkureerivate või koguni vastanduvate huvide ja eesmärkidega erakondadest. Ometi on pärast Teist maailmasõda koalitsioonivalitsused muutunud Euroopas üha sagedaminiesinevateks. Pealegi on sellised valitsused suutnud kõigile raskustele vaatamata riike tõhusalt juhtida ja seejuures stabiilselt koos püsida. Seda on tehtud teatud koalitsioonivalitsuste juurde loodud mitteametlike asutuste abil, mis võimaldavad koalitsioonipartneritel üksteise tegevusel „silma peal hoida“. Käesolevas väitekirjas on selliseid asutusi nimetatud mitteametlikeks vastastikuse järelevalve mehhanismideks (MVJM, ingl. IMOM) ja analüüsitud, kuidas neist neli – parlamendikomisjonide esimeeste ristmääramine, vähemoluliste ministrite ristmääramine, koalitsioonilepingute koostamine ning koalitsiooninõukogude loomine – toimivad Balti riikides.
Balti riigid valiti käesolevas töös uurimisobjektiks, sest sarnaselt Lääne-Euroopa riikidele on neis suur osatähtsus koalitsioonivalitsustel, mis on võrdlemisi stabiilsed ja toimivad edukalt. Samas on nende riikide vastavad ajaloolised arengud olnud märgatavalt erinevad ja tunduvalt kiiremad. Seega pakuvad Balti riigid ainulaadset võimalust uurida selliste MVJMide arengut aja jooksul ja kuulda tähelepanekuid inimestelt, kes on ise mänginud olulisi rolle selliste asutuste loomisel.
Käesolev väitekiri jõuab järeldusele, et MVJMide kasutamist Baltimaades suunasid üldjoontes samasugused põhjused nagu Lääne-Euroopas ja sealseid MVJMe kasutatakse sarnasel moel. Samas on Balti riigid seoses oma teistsuguse ajalooga kasutanud teatud MVJMe nagu näiteks parlamendikomisjonide esimeeste ristmääramist suuremas ulatuses kui Lääne-Euroopa riikides, aga mõned Lääne-Euroopas populaarsed MVJMid nagu näiteks vähemoluliste ministrite ristmääramine pole Balti riikides kunagi populaarsust võitnud.
Samuti näitab käesolev väitekiri, et MVJMe on parem käsitleda kui ühtset järelevalvesüsteemi, mitte kui eraldiseisvaid instrumente. MVJMide kasutamine sõltub kahest tegurirühmast: tegurid, mis on seotud järelevalve alase vajadusega koalitsioonivalitsuses ja MVJMide kasutamisega seonduvad kulud. Väitekirja üheks peamiseks panuseks on suurema tähelepanu pööramine järelevalvega seonduvatele kuludele, mida seni on uuritud võrdlemisi vähe.
Making governmental coalitions work is difficult. After all, they are composed of different parties, which have competing (if not conflicting) interests and different goals. However, since the end of WWII, coalition cabinets became ever more frequent in European democracies and, even more importantly, they managed to govern effectively and achieve cabinet stability against all difficulties. This was done by creating certain informal institutions in the coalition cabinets which help coalition partners to “keep-tabs” on each other. This dissertation calls these institutions Informal Mutual Oversight Mechanisms (IMOMs) and analyses how four of them: cross-appointments of parliamentary committee chairs, cross-appointments of junior ministers, drafting coalition agreements, and creating coalition committees function in the Baltic states. Baltic states were chosen for this work because they, just like the Western European countries, have a high share of coalition cabinets which are quite stable and function well. However, at the same time, their historical development was quite different and much faster. Therefore, the Baltic states offer a unique opportunity to study the development of these IMOMs over time and to gain insights from the people who personally played a major role in creating these institutions. This dissertation finds that the use of IMOMs in the Baltic states was driven largely by same reasons as in Western Europe and that IMOMs there are used in very similar manner. However, due to their different histories, Baltic states have made use of certain IMOMs, like cross-appointing parliamentary committee chairs, to a larger extent then in the Western European countries, while some IMOMs which have been popular in the Western Europe, like cross appointing junior ministers, never gained popularity in the Baltic states. Finally, this dissertation demonstrates that IMOMs are best understood not as separate instruments but rather as a single system of oversight. How these IMOMs are used depends on two factor groups: factors related to the demand for oversight in the coalition cabinet and the costs associated with using these IMOMs. One of the main contributions of the dissertation is bringing more attention to the factors related with the costs of oversight, which have been understudied before.
Making governmental coalitions work is difficult. After all, they are composed of different parties, which have competing (if not conflicting) interests and different goals. However, since the end of WWII, coalition cabinets became ever more frequent in European democracies and, even more importantly, they managed to govern effectively and achieve cabinet stability against all difficulties. This was done by creating certain informal institutions in the coalition cabinets which help coalition partners to “keep-tabs” on each other. This dissertation calls these institutions Informal Mutual Oversight Mechanisms (IMOMs) and analyses how four of them: cross-appointments of parliamentary committee chairs, cross-appointments of junior ministers, drafting coalition agreements, and creating coalition committees function in the Baltic states. Baltic states were chosen for this work because they, just like the Western European countries, have a high share of coalition cabinets which are quite stable and function well. However, at the same time, their historical development was quite different and much faster. Therefore, the Baltic states offer a unique opportunity to study the development of these IMOMs over time and to gain insights from the people who personally played a major role in creating these institutions. This dissertation finds that the use of IMOMs in the Baltic states was driven largely by same reasons as in Western Europe and that IMOMs there are used in very similar manner. However, due to their different histories, Baltic states have made use of certain IMOMs, like cross-appointing parliamentary committee chairs, to a larger extent then in the Western European countries, while some IMOMs which have been popular in the Western Europe, like cross appointing junior ministers, never gained popularity in the Baltic states. Finally, this dissertation demonstrates that IMOMs are best understood not as separate instruments but rather as a single system of oversight. How these IMOMs are used depends on two factor groups: factors related to the demand for oversight in the coalition cabinet and the costs associated with using these IMOMs. One of the main contributions of the dissertation is bringing more attention to the factors related with the costs of oversight, which have been understudied before.