EU-Russia relations in times of war: institutional learning across three crises

Abstract

The following thesis analysed European Union’s responses to Russia in regard to the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian conflict, and the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The study analysed the concept of institutional learning within the European Union as an explanatory factor of its varied responses. A combination of the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and process tracing was used in order to conduct this work and to show how the EU gradually adapted to the geopolitical reality and developed its institutional tools, frameworks, capabilities and resources. The findings show that while the EU initially lacked the capacity and unity to effectively address those crises of 2008 and 2014, it developed and further strengthened the institutional mechanisms, which in turn, permitted a more comprehensive and unified response to Russia during the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The study demonstrated that the European Union ‘learned’ how to respond to crises due to external shocks and consequently internal, gradual institutional developments. Those external factors are considered to be the 2008 and the 2014 crises of Georgia and Ukraine. The study also highlighted that the presence of institutional learning became especially evident after the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), which emphasized the need for structural reforms to develop its crisis management capabilities. additionally, the research highlighted that as the EU’s “capability-expectations gap” gradually narrowed, it facilitated the alignment of its actions with its declared norms and principles.