A response to the practicality issue in the abolitionist animal rights framework

Abstract

In this thesis I have looked into the conflict between the abolitionist animal rights approach and the welfarist approach. The welfarists focus on animals’ right to not suffer, whilst the abolitionists recognize the animals’ right to life and that the root issue of animal suffering is their exploitation, predominantly in animal agriculture. The main way to implement abolitionist ideas into the real life is through veganism – the practice of abstaining from the use of animals in food as well as other areas of life. In the second chapter I looked into the criticism towards the abolitionist approach, according to which veganism as an ethical requirement is too demanding and unrealistic. I then explained how ethical requirements such as veganism sometimes have to be demanding yet can still have practical value by providing an ideal. In the third chapter I proposed a nonideal approach, according to which we ought to eat less meat as per secondary requirements. I also introduced a scalar approach to wrongness. This theoretical framework recognizes that some acts are more wrong than others, for example eating more meat is more wrong than eating less meat, yet we can maintain the ideal that eating meat still wrongs animals.