An insight to the EU military missions in Africa: French leadership and beyond

Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to analyse the leadership role member states – in particular France – play in implementing the European Union`s Common Foreign and Security Policy with military crisis management missions in Africa. To that end, the research conducted in this thesis is placed within the framework of liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) theory. LI presupposes the centrality of the nation state in the European integration project, allowing for a closer analysis of the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy, and of the member states interests and motivations in the process, coupled with the limitations the system places on possible outcomes, with a focus on France. This is then placed in the integral context of the EU military missions to Africa, starting with Operation Artemis to the Democratic Republic of Congo, followed by EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR and Operation Atalanta/EU NAVFOR, with a brief overview of two non-missions that were under consideration. The thesis argues that EU military interventions in Africa are primarily done at the leadership of France, with the necessity of unanimity and compromise in a heterogeneous, ambiguous framework together with a need for political will and resource allocation from member states severely limits mission mandates as well as gives them a secondary rationale beyond humanitarian considerations.